Reconstruction after World War II required policymakers to untangle corporate structures that had upheld authoritarian rule and military expansion. Gregory Jackson argues that today, governments should adjust and apply past lessons to digital power, ensuring that private firms with the potential to weaponize political power via public dependence are still held democratically accountable.
In late summer 2022, Ukraine asked SpaceX to extend coverage of its Starlink satellite internet service toward Crimea to support an attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. SpaceX’s CEO, Elon Musk, refused, citing escalation risks. Subsequent reporting clarified that SpaceX did not switch off an existing service: coverage near Crimea had already been restricted, and Ukraine asked that it be enabled. The interesting fact is that a privately controlled communications network had become part of the operational terrain of war. Its boundaries were not set only by military commanders, diplomats, or elected officials, but also by a corporation controlling an indispensable infrastructure.
This episode illustrates a form of corporate power that goes beyond political lobbying or monopoly power in conventional markets. Governments increasingly depend on a few firms for cloud computing, artificial intelligence, satellite communications, data analytics, and other infrastructures through which states themselves act. These firms do not merely sell products to governments. They increasingly shape how governments communicate, store information, classify risk, deliver services, conduct surveillance, and project power.
The democratic stakes rise when economic capacities become political capacities. Public agencies may become dependent on private providers they cannot easily inspect, replace, or govern. Geopolitical rivalry may turn those same firms into strategic national assets. Citizens may find themselves governed through systems whose design, ownership, and accountability remain largely private. The problem is not simply economic concentration, but the potential for political abuse when private capabilities become entangled with public authority.
From influence to dependence
Companies frequently use lobbying to influence government policy. In 2025, federal lobbying disclosures showed that Meta spent about $26 million, Amazon spent $18 million, and Google spent $13 million on federal lobbying in the United States. Lobby expenditure does not demonstrate policy capture, yet corporate resources for political influence are considerable.
A less familiar problem arises when influence merges with dependence. A 2024 investigation by the Government Accountability Office found that restrictive software licensing practices increased the costs for federal agencies to use cloud services and limited their choice of providers. One contractor that moved an agency’s data into the cloud required the agency to pay to regain ownership of its own data at the end of the contract. Beyond costs, dependence can erode public expertise and control over essential services. Agencies remain answerable for decisions made using systems they may be unable to inspect or fully understand. Where such systems inform decisions about public benefits, policing, or other essential services, citizens may struggle to understand these decisions or challenge mistakes.
In artificial intelligence, geopolitical competition can deepen dependence. The Trump administration’s AI Action Plan frames leadership in AI development as a race for economic and military advantage. When policymakers regard private technological capabilities as essential to national advantage, developing them can take priority over addressing concentration and dependence. Procurement, subsidies, and regulatory choices may strengthen leading providers while embedding their systems more deeply in public operations. Palantir offers a clear example. Since 2018, U.S. Army contracts have helped expand its data and AI systems from applications in personnel and combat readiness into the core software supporting the Army Data Platform, spanning logistics, recruiting, finance, force management, and other functions. The result can be mutually reinforcing: governments become increasingly dependent on leading firms while public policy helps consolidate those firms’ economic and strategic importance.
When corporate capabilities become essential to government and military power, their ownership and control become questions of democratic governance. Beyond antitrust and regulation, how should democracies govern economic capabilities on which public authority depends? This was a central concern of postwar reformers in Germany and Japan, who made the reorganization of corporate power part of democratic reconstruction.
Governing corporate power after 1945
After the end of World War II in 1945, Allied policymakers confronted Germany and Japan as defeated industrial powers whose corporate structures had become entangled with authoritarian rule and military expansion. Their concern extended beyond monopoly pricing to the political abuse of economic power: corporate resources and organizational capabilities could help sustain authoritarian rule and military aggression. This did not require firms to dictate government policy; accommodation, collaboration, and commercial interests could also make them integral to those projects.
In Germany, Franz Neumann’s wartime analysis famously emphasized the interaction among large industrial combines, the Nazi Party, the bureaucracy, and the military. The case of corporate monopoly IG Farben, which thrived under the rule of the Nazi Party, illustrates how these relationships operated in practice. Peter Hayes and other historians show that IG Farben did not dictate Nazi policy, but adapted to it, sought to become indispensable, profited from rearmament and autarky, and became complicit in forced labor, including in Auschwitz. Rearmament increased state intervention while deepening the regime’s dependence on its largest manufacturers, whose share of production grew through state contracts. Greater state direction could thus coexist with increasing corporate concentration and reciprocal dependence. The Allies seized IG Farben and planned its dissolution.
The policy logic was unusually explicit. A draft Control Council law from the U.S. in November 1945 argued that excessive concentrations could become “instruments of political or economic aggression” and therefore linked economic decentralization to peaceful and democratic reconstruction. Japan presented a different organizational structure. Thezaibatsu—family-controlled groups such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda—used holding companies to centralize finance and control across industrial and financial firms. The occupation targeted this concentration through holding company dissolution, share redistribution, and the removal of family control, as documented by T. A. Bisson.
Postwar reconstruction went beyond regulating large firms and focused on reshaping corporate ownership, internal authority, and public governance. Three distinct mechanisms stand out. The first was deconcentration: breaking up or weakening industrial combines in Germany and family-controlled holding companies in Japan. Second, reconstruction focused on countervailing power inside firms. In West Germany, codetermination in coal and steel placed equal numbers of worker and shareholder representatives on supervisory boards of corporations. In Japan, occupational labor reforms established rights to union organization and collective bargaining, enabling workers to challenge managerial authority without introducing German-style board representation. The third approach was to place strategically important industries within institutions that extended beyond individual firms. In Europe, the proposed European Coal and Steel Community pooled authority over coal and steel production under a common supranational framework. The aim was not to eliminate markets—the ECSC itself created a common market for coal and steel—but to ensure that industries central to economic reconstruction and military power were subject to shared rules and oversight. The Schuman Declaration argued that pooling these industries could raise living standards while making another Franco-German war “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”
These were distinct initiatives, involving different actors, objectives, and political compromises, rather than components of a single Allied blueprint. Geopolitical priorities also weakened reforms: as the Cold War intensified, the U.S. retreated from parts of its deconcentration agenda and accepted renewed consolidation in German banking and industry. Still, taken together, these reforms challenged the premise that ownership entitled private actors to govern strategically consequential enterprises on their own terms. Democratic reconstruction also meant changing who controlled corporations, who exercised authority within them, and what institutions governed their activities.
What makes digital dependence different
The historical continuity lies in the conversion of economic capacity into political power. Coal, steel, and chemicals supplied essential material capabilities for warfare and state action. In the modern age, digital infrastructures create different forms of power through the capacity to accumulate, connect and analyze information at enormous scale. They also organize political communication and systems through which governments identify and classify people, deliver public services, and make decisions. Their governance consequently affects both the exercise of public authority and people’s ability to contest it.
Control over personal data and communication platforms creates opportunities to shape political life. Detailed knowledge of users enables targeted political appeals, while decisions about ranking and access influence which voices become visible. These capabilities can serve commercial interests or advance owners’ political commitments. Political abuse arises when they are used to undermine political freedom, suppress opposition, or obstruct scrutiny.
Ownership and governance determine who can exercise this power, including across different domains. Amazon combines commerce, consumer data, and cloud infrastructure serving the Pentagon’s Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability. Its founder, executive chair, and substantial minority shareholder, Jeff Bezos, separately owns the Washington Post. Alphabet combines its ownership of YouTube with internet search, advertising, and cloud services—including participation in the same Pentagon program—while its founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, retain 52.7 percent of voting power. These examples show how corporate ownership and control connect economic, informational, and military capabilities.
Government dependence compounds this problem. Providers’ design choices help determine what information agencies can access and act upon, even where governments formally own the data. Systems sold to improve public safety or administrative efficiency can expand surveillance and coercive capacity while making agencies reliant on private infrastructure and expertise. In December 2025, Charlottesville, Virginia declined to continue its Flock Safety camera program amid concerns about privacy, potential federal access to locally collected data, and the limits of local control. Commercial incentives and governmental ambitions can reinforce one another without a shared political project: governments become more dependent on private providers while gaining greater power over individuals.
The democratic stakes extend beyond questions of alternative suppliers to who controls digital capabilities, who governs their use, and how both corporate and governmental power over individuals can be constrained.
Democratizing digital power
Learning from postwar reform calls for recovering a broader institutional imagination while adapting it to the capabilities and risks of digital infrastructure. Competition policy, interoperability, and procurement safeguards can reduce dependence on dominant providers. But making suppliers more replaceable does not by itself democratize control over data, constrain surveillance, or redistribute corporate authority. The postwar experience suggests three complementary approaches: reorganizing ownership and control, creating countervailing power inside firms, and establishing accountable governance above them.
First, deconcentration means scrutinizing how ownership structures and contractual relationships connect commercial data, political communication, and military infrastructure. Restrictions on common ownership, structural separation, and alternative ownership arrangements could constrain the accumulation and combination of power across these domains. Should essential infrastructure providers also control businesses dependent on their services? Should common control of communication platforms and military services face limits? Durable reform must also prevent ownership or contractual ties from restoring concentration. Open standards, interoperability, and public technical capacity can help sustain independent alternatives rather than simply replacing dependence on one dominant provider with dependence on another.
Second, strategically consequential firms need countervailing authority inside their own governance. Comparative research on the public interest and the corporation shows how corporate governance can institutionalize wider social interests rather than leaving them entirely to external regulation. Postwar codetermination offers a precedent for democratizing industry by giving employees an institutional role alongside shareholders. Employee-elected directors can bring knowledge of internal operations and workers’ concerns into corporate decision-making, strengthen scrutiny of management, and require executives to justify decisions to representatives beyond shareholders. Public-interest representation could extend this principle, particularly where corporate decisions affect essential public services or people subject to surveillance. Such representatives would need clear mandates and accountability. The aim is to redistribute authority over corporate strategy and purpose, making consequential decisions subject to deliberation among participants whom owners and executives cannot simply disregard.
Third, strategically consequential infrastructures require accountable public governance beyond the firm and, in some cases, beyond the nation-state. Domestically, public obligations should follow public functions: continuity of essential services, auditability, and limits on data collection and use should be enforceable. Where private systems shape public decisions, citizens should retain meaningful rights to explanation and redress. Independent oversight must constrain governmental as well as corporate uses of these capabilities. The Coal and Steel Community illustrates how states can pool authority over strategic industries rather than leaving each government to act separately. Today, geopolitical rivalry encourages governments to strengthen national technology champions, often reinforcing the dependencies they seek to manage. Yet shared vulnerabilities may also create incentives for cooperation. Governments could jointly invest in critical cloud, AI, and satellite capabilities, establish common obligations, and create institutions to oversee strategically important services. Such arrangements could provide alternatives where individual states lack the resources to act independently but would themselves require democratic oversight and clear accountability to those affected by their decisions.
Postwar reformers understood that democracy required more than regulating corporate conduct. In Germany and Japan, however, the opportunity to reorganize economic power came only after the catastrophe of war and military defeat. The challenge today is to find the political imagination to act before such crises make reform unavoidable.
Author’s Disclosures: The author reports no conflicts of interest. You can read our disclosure policy here.
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