In the middle of Norway’s Hardangerfjord, I steady myself against waves that jostle the floating metal ring that encircles an enormous fish pen. My burly host laughs as I grip the railing. He needs no such assistance. With one hand, he grips an oversized bucket of pellets; with the other, he launches a spray into the pen. The water ripples and an instant later a silvery-blue cloud of salmon bodies starts breaking the surface.
This little meal is just for show. Throughout the day, a giant Akvasmart feed system shoots an enormous cascade of pellets — a mix of grains, legumes, synthetic astaxanthin pigment and the cooked, pressed and processed bodies of smaller, scaly fish — through long pipes into the pen, where between 150,000 and 200,000 salmon are growing plump. Across all the pens of the facility, more than a million salmon are raised this way.
Not long before visiting Hardangerfjord, I was walking down a long dock in Chimbote, Peru. Usually, one of the sprawling plants behind me would have been belching out fumes, processing anchoveta — a small, oily fish caught in enormous quantities off the South American coast — into protein-rich fishmeal for farmed fish and livestock, and into oil prized for its omega-3s. But fishing had been temporarily suspended to protect the stock as El Niño warmed the waters off Peru, and only the faintest smell of fish and sewage wafted across the bay. Everyone was frustrated, from the fishermen lingering in the port town to the factory managers who would otherwise be overseeing the processing of billions of finger-length fish by shiny German-made machines.
The fishmeal industry, like many other extractive ones, is resilient and adaptive. It was born of scrappy ingenuity in the 1950s, when local businessmen repurposed old tuna canneries and sold fishmeal to postwar European and American farmers to fatten chickens and hogs. It crashed dramatically in the early 1970s as overfishing and a powerful El Niño devastated anchoveta stocks, then was born again in the 1990s as global aquaculture expanded — especially Norway’s new salmon industry. Today, executives in Lima told me, Chinese demand for grouper and crab feed keeps their industry hot, with some modest help from the Americans and Europeans who purchase fish oil supplements in abundance.
But the same ingenuity that built the fishmeal industry stands to transform it beyond recognition. Just as Norwegian and Chilean salmon producers learned to use less fishmeal by substituting plant proteins, the Chinese aquaculture industry will be quick to replicate the same industrial sleight of hand. Fish oil, the other valuable product extracted from those billions of tiny fish, is contending with substitutes of its own. Feed companies can already obtain prized fatty acids, used in both omega-3 supplements for humans and in feed for farmed salmon, from algae grown in fermentation tanks and from canola bioengineered to produce them. For now, these substitutes remain expensive and difficult to scale. But if they become cheap enough to absorb the growth in demand, aquaculture could grow increasingly independent of the anchoveta catch it once depended on.
It’s a story as old as capitalism. A substance essential to modern life is grown or mined for a time, sustaining jobs (albeit often coercive, poorly paid, dangerous ones) and underpinning supply chains, but before long, a technoscientific innovation replicates that commodity or its function in a laboratory. Sometimes that ersatz substance is made from other, less geographically particular resources: tree resins, field crops, petroleum. Eventually, the supply chain migrates away from the original resource, stranding people and economies. The commodity may persist, or even thrive as a premium good, while losing the scale, price and indispensability that once sustained places organized around its production. Nylon took the place of silk in stockings and parachutes, polypropylene displaced sisal in agricultural twine, and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl allowed drugmakers to produce powerful painkillers without growing a single poppy.
This pattern is about to become easier to repeat. Protein language models can explore vast regions of protein sequence space, synthetic biology can program microbes to produce particular compounds and precision fermentation offers one way to produce them at industrial scale. SpudCell, an experimental synthetic cell announced in July 2026 by teams at the University of Minnesota, hints at more radical biological transformations to come. Assembled from nonliving components, it can grow, copy its DNA and divide itself independently. Finding useful substitutes has long been a sluggish, episodic process, but tools like these may make the search more systematic, expanding the range of resources whose uses can be replicated at industrial scale.
We do not need to know the year when tank-fermented omega-3s become cheap enough to displace fish oil in order to start counting the people whose livelihoods may melt into air. Elsewhere in the food industry, egg and whey proteins made by genetically engineered microbes have already entered the market. Firms are developing substitutes for coffee and cocoa — on which millions of smallholder farmers and their families depend — using other crops, by-products and processes to reproduce their flavors, fats and functional compounds. Substitutes don’t need to perfectly replicate a coffee bean or cacao pod, much less eliminate its cultivation, to erode the markets that sustain those producers.
The production of critical materials — and with it some limited bargaining power — is moving from fields and cultivators toward firms controlling datasets, patents and bioreactors. These technologies promise real emancipations. They might lessen pressure on fragile ecologies, loosen the links between consumption and forced labor, and insulate food supplies from the vagaries of climate and disease. But for regions overly dependent on a single commodity, the same progress carries the prospect of ruin.
The transition away from resource extraction will require a “temporary phase of maladjustment” every bit as tumultuous as the technologically driven unemployment that John Maynard Keynes described a century ago. But some transitions will merit anticipation and management, particularly when their benefits are widely dispersed while their costs are concentrated in places with little capacity to absorb them.
In Botswana, an extractive development model turned diamonds into schools, hospitals and the infrastructure of an upper-middle-income state. Competition from laboratory-grown stones, alongside weakening demand for mined diamonds, is already unsettling the fiscal foundations of that achievement. Malawi remains heavily dependent on burley tobacco exports. Nicotine in e-cigarettes and pouches can be extracted from tobacco scraps, weakening the case for paying for the qualities that make cured leaf valuable to cigarette manufacturers. Nicotine, too, can be synthesized without the plant. If smokers continue migrating toward these products, demand for nicotine could outlast demand for Malawi’s leaf.
What happens to Malawi’s tobacco growers when it does? Beyond the specter of existential risk, much of the hand-wringing over artificial intelligence turns on what will become of knowledge workers when a machine can do their work. Cultivators, miners and fishermen around the world will confront a question familiar to generations of others who cultivated or extracted some natural resource for a global trade: What happens when chemists learn to make that resource in a distant lab?
Madder is a compact, leafy cousin of the coffee plant. It shoots its slender roots deep into loamy soil. Dried and ground, those roots yield a red dye of inimitable richness. Madder colored textiles buried with Tutankhamun and the russet horses of the Bayeux Tapestry; transformed into a translucent pigment, it gave warmth to garments painted by Raphael, Rembrandt and Vermeer. Its reds became emblems of national identity, from the coats of British infantrymen and Ottoman fezes to the red-and-white bandanas of the American cowboy.
But in 1868, two German chemists, Carl Graebe and Carl Liebermann, coaxed alizarin, one of madder’s red colorants, from a compound found in coal tar. A cheaper industrial process followed the next year. As production expanded, madder growers from Holland to the south of France to the Levant found that buyers purchased far fewer of the roots that they had once meticulously shade-dried and powdered.
In the decades after, the world’s riot of natural color gave way to sophisticated distillations of hydrocarbons synthesized in the German and Swiss cauldrons of capitalism. Peasants in Oaxaca, Guatemala and the Canary Islands were next to learn that the cochineal insects they bred on prickly-pear cactuses and rendered into dye lost most of their textile market to chemical substitutes. In eastern India, synthetic blues doomed the natural indigo that European planters had forced peasants to cultivate.
Two years after Graebe and Liebermann’s 1868 synthesis of alizarin, the American inventor John Wesley Hyatt, working to produce billiard balls without the expense of ivory, patented a process for turning nitrocellulose and camphor into the world’s first commercially successful plastic. Celluloid promised to loosen manufacturing’s dependence on rare animal materials, even as it created new demands on natural camphor forests. “As petroleum came to the relief of the whale,” an 1878 pamphlet crowed, so “has celluloid given the elephant, the tortoise, and the coral insect a respite in their native haunts; and it will no longer be necessary to ransack the earth in pursuit of substances which are constantly growing scarcer.” This prediction was premature. But by the closing decades of the 19th century, these ersatz products were bringing creature comforts to the masses.
BASF drove several early severances. The company made good on the chemical fantasy of the early 19th century — no less a dream, the theorist Esther Leslie wrote, than “to reproduce the world synthetically and from the cheapest stuffs.” BASF scientists were farsighted in their vision of remaking the foundations of life itself.
One of the great infusions of soil fertility came from Peru, where workers mined millions of tons of nitrogen-rich guano from coastal islands. As the richest deposits were exhausted, Chilean nitrate took its place. Then the Haber-Bosch process, commercialized by BASF, displaced nitrate with ammonia made from atmospheric nitrogen, helping drive the long decline of Chile’s nitrate export economy — but enabling a great global growth in agricultural productivity that today sustains half the world’s population.
Substitutes derived from tree resins and fossil fuels cleaved a range of industries from their former natural suppliers. Japan’s colonial camphor monopoly in Taiwan had turned mountain trees into celluloid, photographic film, explosives and moth repellents before a German firm turned turpentine into a synthetic equivalent. At roughly the same time, chemists learned to dissolve wood pulp and respin its cellulose into rayon. “At last,” the American scientific evangelist Edwin Slosson exulted in 1919, “man has risen to the level of the worm and can spin threads to suit himself.”
Slosson, like many futurists of his age, saw in silk an inevitable law of development that governed the world’s natural resources: Man would use natural products, learn to cultivate them and eventually manufacture substitutes. That logic was cold comfort to the women in Japan who had grown mulberries and raised silkworms for American and European hosiery, and who watched rayon and then nylon decimate their production. Bengal’s jute cultivators supplied the raw material for sacks and hessian, and on Tanganyika’s sisal plantations, workers stripped leaves into fiber for twine and rope. Petroleum-based substitutes ate steadily into both markets.
The very goal of science, the British polymath J.B.S. Haldane predicted in 1923, was “man’s gradual conquest, first of space and time, then of matter as such, then of his own body and those of other living beings.” This conquest soon reached medicines and insecticides. After World War II, synthetic antimalarials sharply reduced the market for quinine from Java’s cinchona plantations; synthetic insecticides later came for Kenya’s pyrethrum trade.
Soon the conquest came for reproduction. Beginning in the 1940s, chemists at Mexico-based pharmaceutical firms turned diosgenin from wild barbasco yams into inexpensive steroid hormones, including progesterone and the progestins that helped make the birth-control pill possible. The trade boomed for three decades, but from the 1970s, microbial processes using soy sterols, total chemical synthesis and cheaper Chinese yams steadily displaced barbasco harvested in Veracruz, Oaxaca and Tabasco.
Many 20th-century substitutions, when they did not initiate a geographically concentrated shock, appeared to be unalloyed progress. The invention and commercialization of recombinant human insulin in the late 20th century meant that Eli Lilly and Novo Industri — later Novo Nordisk — no longer needed pig and cow pancreases. And some severances were less than absolute. Bangladeshi and Tanzanian farmers continued to grow jute and sisal long after they lost their commercial luster; a much-diminished Peruvian industry to this day exports cochineal to tint certain shades of Maybelline lipstick, Yoplait strawberry yogurt and Theraflu cold and cough caplets.
Political protection can keep systems operating and crops growing for decades, allowing entire systems of dependence to grow around them. In 2019 in Mandsaur, a flat and hot district in India’s historic opium heartland, I walked compact poppy fields where parchment-white flowers were dropping off knobby capsules. A few weeks after my winter visit, the men and women I spoke with would score those poppies with curved knives, harvesting raw opium sap in a manner unchanged for two centuries.
The crop still underwrites domestic painkiller production in India. But although there is no meaningful economic or pharmaceutical case for harvesting it by hand, the farmers’ votes have kept fieldhands busy. Beginning in the 19th century, advances in chemistry and pharmacology threatened to sideline the opium poppy’s role in pain relief. Poppies continued to be grown by smallholders in India and Turkey, under regimes structured by treaty and policed by a global bureaucracy — until a re-engineered Tasmanian poppy and synthetics like fentanyl reduced the role of the farmer, the plant and the field in the work of pain relief. Even those Tasmanian poppies may not last: Researchers have also produced opioid compounds in engineered yeast, opening the possibility of future severances.
Keeping India’s opium harvest going carried costs of its own. A crop turned just as easily into heroin as into morphine fueled a regional black market. Farmers were encouraged to keep planting, delaying the transition to other crops or other work. Ending the harvest grew harder with each season: It meant replacing livelihoods, unwinding electoral bargains and disrupting illicit supply chains that decades of protection had helped entrench. For regions facing the next wave of substitutes, the question is how to begin financing other livelihoods while the old industry still sustains them.
No government or institution has yet built a transition mechanism directly linking the rise of a laboratory-developed substitute to the restructuring of the region whose commodity it displaces. But many of the necessary frameworks already exist.
Fifty years ago, governments understood that eliminating a crop would require compensating farmers to leave it behind, though they struggled to dislodge regionally important crops. Turkey’s 1971 poppy ban, an early salvo in the U.S. “war on drugs,” failed to make good on its promise of a well-compensated transition away from opium into crops like lentils or beets.
Later and better-organized efforts in the Global North with the weight of large industries behind them fared better. In 2006, when the European Union shrank its sugar industry, it created a restructuring fund that ultimately took in about €6.2 billion. A levy on quota holders financed factory closures, paid growers and helped diversify the hardest-hit regions; the EU supported 18 African, Caribbean and Pacific sugar economies as the preferential market on which they had long depended was reorganized.
In that same decade, America’s tobacco buyout required manufacturers and importers to finance payments to growers and quota owners. That model was basic but portable: Peru adopted a version of it in 2008 when its fishing industry sought to end the wild scramble for anchoveta. The fishing companies that retained lucrative quota rights were required to finance retraining, retirement and small-business assistance. In Chimbote, I spoke with many fishermen still bristling at being pushed aside, but the compensation model is one foundational framework.
A second approach begins with the idea that industries owe a share of the wealth they create to the people and places that supplied their biological resources and knowledge. Efforts to put that obligation into practice gained ground in the early 21st century, but the promised benefits have generally failed to materialize.
After public pressure, South Africa’s national research organization agreed to share with the San people royalties from an appetite-suppressing compound derived from hoodia, a spiny desert succulent. UC Berkeley and the AIDS Research Alliance made similar agreements with the Samoan government and descendants of traditional healers over an antiviral compound isolated from the mamala tree. Neither compound was ever commercialized. South Africa’s rooibos industry offers a rare example of payments that did reach communities: It now pays the Khoikhoi and San, recognized as the plant’s traditional knowledge holders, a small levy tied to the crop’s farm-gate price.
International law and agreements have offered conceptual frameworks for sharing. The Nagoya Protocol, adopted in 2010, strengthened international rules for sharing the benefits of genetic resources with the countries and communities that provide them. The Cali Fund, which took shape at the 2024 and 2025 COP16 sessions, asks companies profiting from genetic-sequence data to share some of that value with biodiversity-rich countries and communities. But these schemes have outpaced countries’ and companies’ willingness to adopt them: The Nagoya Protocol has yet to be meaningfully implemented, and as of October 2026, the Cali Fund had received just over $10,000 from five contributors. And a focus on genetic data does little for the commodity markets that laboratory substitutes will disrupt.
But the case for financing transitions should appeal more directly to consuming countries’ own self-interest. Perhaps the bluntest consequence of uncompensated severances is that they would undermine their own environmental promise, sending a cocoa or coffee farmer into forest clearing or illegal mining. The costs could spread through political instability and migration, import bans and tariffs, and subsidies that keep declining industries alive. (Just ask a director in India’s labyrinthine opium bureaucracy.) A collapse in Botswana’s diamond market could threaten healthcare in Gaborone and Francistown, while rising debt and falling demand would carry the shock across Southern Africa and beyond. Displacement from coffee- and cocoa-growing regions could likewise reshape politics in the Global North.
Converting foreknowledge into leverage is a global project, and no national or regional scheme will be large enough. But the European Union has the regulatory influence on supply chains to start it. Already, the EU makes importers of certain steel products account for the carbon dioxide emitted in making them. From the end of 2026, operators selling products like coffee, soy and cocoa in the EU will have to demonstrate that these products are deforestation-free. Already, these regulations are proving more consequential than their detractors believed. This October, in Mato Grosso, Brazil, I spoke with a soy farmer in front of a vast field of seedlings, listening as he described how planters and processors were working to meet this new directive. A severance regulation that began in Europe would impact producers well beyond the continent. Any large company selling a designated substitute in Europe, whether based in Paris, California or Shenzhen, might be required to register a product and begin paying a declining levy on its European sales once measurable displacement began.
A scheme like this would require innovative producers to think proactively about the severances their goods might provoke. If provenance labels and QR codes look backwards, following salmon to a pen or eggs to a farm, a public severance assessment would look forward, asking what function a new product performs, which commodities it is likely to displace and what regions are most exposed to change. After being triggered — presumably after crossing a published threshold of European sales or producing a measurable fall in demand for the original commodity — the levy would decline over a fixed number of years and flow into transition trusts in producing regions.
As fermentation-derived cocoa fats and flavors move from the laboratory into chocolate and ice cream, trusts in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire might use levy proceeds to finance crop diversification, forest restoration and more locally owned processing. Some farmers might reposition land-grown cacao as a “heritage” good to be sold at a premium. But boutique cacao is no answer for the millions of people who now depend on the bulk trade. A bolder severance agreement could pay part of the obligation as equity or a temporary share of sales, allowing the trust to profit from the substitute’s growth instead of merely absorbing the old industry’s decline.
Peru has already managed several fishing transitions. A trust financed by levies on algal omega-3 sales could help convert industrial sites into food-grade fish-processing facilities, clean bays polluted by fishmeal production and support the scallop and oyster farms already operating along the Áncash coast. Such trusts would invite capture. Industries dependent on the older commodities would lobby for a share of the money, and administrators would face pressure to cushion every producer’s loss. But their administrators would be wise to avoid the fantasy of a frictionless market transition, continuing to underwrite the purchase of commodities like fish oil simply to keep demand alive after market demand has disappeared. India’s poppy fields show what happens when transition assistance hardens into permanent demand.
In the aquaculture facilities nestled in Norway’s Hardangerfjord, pellets made with oil from algae or engineered canola may look no different from today’s buckshot as they arc into salmon pens. The difference will appear thousands of miles away in Chimbote’s docks and plants, where a share of the new oils’ sales could help workers build new livelihoods from the infrastructure of the old industry.
Chemists have been removing place from product since they first learned to make madder red from coal tar. Emerging technologies could bring that upheaval to more places in quicker succession, and politics must now give those places the means to build a future after their markets have gone.




